"High Noon" and "The Magic Hour"

看過烈日當空，是一部悲觀到不得了的電影，充份描述香港年青人的頹廢和浮躁，算是近10年本港最出色的寫實青春片。可是導演有點貪心，想於片中探討很多課題，有很「哲學」的問題，例如"什麼是正常﹖"、安樂死；有當代社會問題，例如短片、援交、學童性行為、吸毒、家庭疏離、童黨等等等等，有些問題蜻蜓點水，其實不提也罷，幸好沒破壞「頹廢和浮躁的青春」這個重心。

導演說這部戲是關於青春，在戲中經歷青期的主角們有以下人格特徵：

1. 做事不經大腦
   
2. 好色
   
3. 愛浪費時間
   
4. 愛說粗口
   
5. 沒有長遠的願景
   
6. 和成年人疏離
7. 等等

有以上特徵的人，容易對自己的未來絕望。當然，在資本主義體制下，懶人和蠢人都沒有好下場；有以上特徵的人非懶即蠢，他們絕望也是應該的。但這並不表示他們的人生沒有價值，至少他們的青春歲月有笑有淚有兄弟有女溝，總比終日埋首書堆研究重言句的書呆子們有趣(至少你會花40$看兩小時烈日當空，也不會花20$看兩小時哥德爾證明不完備定理)。相比起他們暗淡無光的未來，現在的青春生活有如傍晚或黎明時的Magic Hour般淒美而短暫。既然沒有未來可言，這些青春人做事不在乎後果，不在乎後果的人多會做荒謬的事，荒謬的事做得多生活也會變得荒謬，所以這些青春人的青春生活到頭來是荒謬的生活，加上一些偶然發生的荒謬事件，所以主角會有「每一天都有更荒謬的事發生」這個想法。

「每一天都有更荒謬的事發生」看似是一個悲觀的論點，黑幫有個荷里活中的高瀨允卻另有看法，他問村田大樹：「每個人也希望留住Magic Hour，但是Magic Hour一舜即逝，若果錯過了要怎樣做？但明天也可能會有吧，只要不放棄，還是有可能遇上Magic Hour的。」。當然，Magic Hour不能說是荒謬的事件；但既然稱得上是Magic Hour，當有不何思議之處。青春人在頹廢和浮躁的青春後還能在這個荒謬的現實活下去，算是不可思議。

不要緊，荒謬的中午過後，Magic Hour也不遠矣。

Survive Without Identity

話說早前看畢Derek Parfit的Reasons and Persons，驚為天人。這本書提出一個有趣的論點：你應該幹甚麼並不取決於你是誰。他這樣論證：如果你的腦袋被一分為二，分別置於兩個人體；或是你的身體會突然消失，但有人預先複製你的記憶和人格，並置於不同但和你極為相似的人體內；或其他類似情境下，沒有所謂那些「複製人」是/不是你。主要的原因在於，不論根據心理連續性或物理連續性，你和那些複製人間沒有「一對一」的關係：因為有多個一個複製人，但你不能同時是他們。但如果說你不是任何一個複製人，那即是說你已經死了；但若果，只有一個複製人會承繼你的半邊腦袋\人格(即一對一的條件成立)，我們有理由相信那個複製人是你，而不會說你已經死了，那麼，如果有多過一個複製人，那應該有一個是你吧，但個個都是一樣，是哪個呢?

Derek Parfit想指出的是，「一對一」和心理/物理連續性只有偶然的關係，但你之所以為你，若不是基於說了等於沒說的靈魂論，就是基於心理或物理連續性，但兩者皆不一定薀含「一對一」的關係，所以，Derek Parfit說，即使我們不知道哪個複製人是你，這無礙我們完備地描述整件事的前因後果；此外，即使沒有複製人會是你，由於他們擁你的人格、欲望和記憶，就和你在正常情況下繼續生活沒兩樣，所以他不是你並不是一個問題，由這推出一個結論："It may be worth to survive without identity"。

鳥，藝術家和小職員

藍姆不是一個全職作家，他事實上是個會計小職員，在東印度公司上班，可能和今天的匯豐出納員差不多。他這樣描寫他的小職員生涯和寫作事業：

"when the mind of your man of letters requires some relaxation -- (and none better than such as at first sight seems most abhorrent from his beloved studies) -- to while away some good hours of my time in the contemplation of indigos, cottons, raw silk, piece-goods, flowered or otherwise. In the first place * * * * * * and then it sends you home with such increased appetite to your books * * * * * not to say, that your outside sheets, and waste wrappers of foolscap, do receive into them, most kindly and naturally, the impression of sonnets, epigrams, essays -- so that the very parings of a counting-house are, in some sort, the settings up of an author. The enfranchised quill, that has plodded all the morning among the cart-rucks of figures and cyphers, frisks and curvets so at its ease over the flowery carpet-ground of a midnight dissertation. -- It feels its promotion. * * * * * * * So that you see, upon the whole, the literary dignity of Elia is very little, if at all, compromised in the condescension. "

藍姆的文章甚少談自己的作者生涯，或應該這樣說，他寫這些文章(即伊利亞隨筆)的時候，像是一個小職員在訴說日常生活多於像是一個文學家在創作甚麼驚天動地的大作。這讓我們這些不懂甚麼文學理論的平凡人，在看他的文章時，感到份外親切。

也許這是我喜歡古典文學的原因，它們的美不用甚麼文學理論的支撐，識字的人都能體會。

**********
當代藝術家喜歡說理論，這本來不是什麼問題，問題是他們都說得不大清楚。喜愛用術語，或多用比喻和象徵性的手法闡述想法。對於我們這些平凡人來說，這些解釋不但不能解惑，反而阻礙大眾親近藝術/文學。(每次去看本地當代藝術展覽，總會看到奇怪的作品和奇怪的Artist's Statements) 那些艱澀的文學/哲學理論就可免則免，除非你有能力用慣常語言來說明那些理論說什麼。那些理論就留給評論家們玩味吧。

有某位物理學家說過，科學哲學的用處對科學家來說就像鳥類學對雀鳥一樣。也許這個說法誇張了點，但事實上，縱使科學哲學的問題談了幾百年也沒有定論，但這並不妨礙自然科學的發展。藝術家和文學家們卻不知從何時開始崇尚那些哲學問題，例如嘗試在他們的藝術創作解答"藝術是什麼"的問題，後來失敗了，就唯有說探索藝術的可能性，後來出席什麼藝術研討會比藝術創作還多。試想想一群科學家有實驗不做，卻談些科學是什學的問題，之後還要開什麼(例如)從女性主義詮釋自然科學會議，是多麼讓人噴飯的事情。


依我看所謂美學或藝術理論，不過是一個或數個原則，用以解釋人們日常生活中的美學判斷，情況就像倫理學原則用以解釋道德判斷。在這裡"{p', p'', p'''....}解釋q"的意思就是說"{p', p'', p'''....}邏輯上蘊涵q"，但這並不是說"{p', p'', p'''....}證明了q"，事實正正相反，若q為真，q印證了{p', p'', p'''....} (參考Carl G. Hempel 的 D. N. Model)。但是由於各種文化和個人品味的因素，每個人的美學判斷差異可以很大或互相矛盾，這使美學判斷看來只不個是個人喜好的某種表達方式，學者們難以確定那些美學判斷作為印證美學理論的個例。但某些美學判斷是無容置疑，例如"莫內的"日出‧印象"比街邊塗鴉美"或"蒙羅麗莎比小學生在桌上的塗鴉美"或"玉山的日出很美"等。一個完備的美學理論至少能為這些美學判斷提供理由，無論如何，美學理論不是藝術品，好的藝術品也不一定要與美學理論「對話」，審美能力人皆有之，與嬰兒生有好惡同理，不需要讀完什麼理論才懂得美。

伊利亞

董橋寫道：「天生閑散的人喜歡藍姆隨筆溫煦；天生尖刻的人討厭藍姆隨筆偽善。」我不知道他人如何看藍姆的伊利亞隨筆(The Essays of Elia)，我這個懶人倒很喜歡他的散文。可是我英文不好，借了回家查了字典也看不出頭緒，到頭來還是買了本中文譯本，中英對照來讀。可惜中文譯本只錄部份作品，非伊利亞隨筆隨筆的全部；可幸的是，不知是我英文進步了，還是那幾篇沒譯文的作品較淺白，譯本遺漏了的文章還能理出個頭來。可喜可賀。

看他的文章很難看出他哀愁的人生，雖不算是活在地獄中，但絕不算活在幸福中。在他的文章不時流露對身邊事物的欣賞，若他的人生真的充滿不幸的事情，我不得不妒忌他對悲傷或哀愁等消極情緒的抵抗能力，或許這源於英國人重視常識的傳統。

一個人因不幸而失去常識是常見的事。例如一些失戀的人要生要死又要刀仔拮大髀，又或者小時候受到猶太人的不友善對待，長大後要屠殺上百萬猶太人等；相信讀者們能點出更多好例子。讀者或會質疑所謂的「常識」是甚麼意思，其實常識不外乎理性上明顯為真的描述或明顯正確的倫理判斷。當然我們未必就常識的外延(extension)有共識；但沒可能會有正常人會質疑「阿媽係女人」、「老闆資金充裕但不準時出糧是不對的」等信念。這些信念構成我們認識世界的基礎。例如，根據歸納法，BBC報道的事情十居其九皆真，所以BBC報道達爾富爾的人道災難該為真。所以常識可謂一個正確世界觀的必需條件。

這些說話看起來好像沒甚麼大不了，提出來有點多餘；常識重要眾人皆知，但是，一般以為常識只限於街市菜價，輪街症，日常生活禮儀或科學常識，或李天命常掛在口邊的思方(當然這些也是相當重要的，尤其是思方)。依我看，一個人有沒有常識最重要還是有沒有所謂sense of proportion，這個概念我不知怎樣繙譯，大意就是說這個世界有很多不同的事情發生，不同的人有不同的際遇，有快樂的事亦有悲傷的事，有些人的一生慘不忍睹，有人如魚得水；因此，我不能從我自己的人生際遇，推論他人的人生也是一樣。例如我不能因我的人生慘不忍睹，就說"這個世界沒有美好的事，所有人都慘不忍睹，只是他們不知道罷了"等結論。這就像在說"我十歲前很窮，我的一生也會很窮"一樣荒謬。(溫馨小提示：其實這是以偏蓋全的謬誤)

照以上的條件看，蘭姆算是常識極強的人。他早年喪母(他姊姊精神病發弒母)，喪兄(英年早逝)，為照顧有精神病的姊姊而終身不娶(21歲求婚失敗，之後就發生弒母事件)，並且沒有上過大學(對於一個求知欲強而又受過一點點教育的英國少年來說，無法繼續上學其實蠻不幸的)。在如此背景下，他仍能以輕鬆的筆調訴說他如何在牛津大學校園中彌補沒有上過大學的遺憾：

"I can here play the gentleman, enact the student. To such a one as myself, who has been defrauded in his young years of the sweet food of academic institution, nowhere is so pleasant, to while away a few idle weeks at, as one or other of the Universities. "

又或是訴說一個畫家在情人節向鄰家女士示愛的故事:

"All Valentines are not foolish; and I shall not easily forget thine, my kind friend (if I may have leave to call you so) E. B. -- E. B. lived opposite a young maiden, whom he had often seen, unseen, from his parlour window in C--e-street. She was all joyousness and innocence, and just of an age to enjoy receiving a Valentine, and just of a temper to bear the disappointment of missing one with good humour. E. B. is an artist of no common powers; in the fancy parts of designing, perhaps inferior to none; his name is known at the bottom of many a well executed vignette in the way of his profession, but no further; for E. B. is modest, and the world meets nobody half-way. E. B. meditated how he could repay this young maiden for many a favour which she had done him unknown; for when a kindly face greets us, though but passing by, and never knows us again, nor we it, we should feel it as an obligation; and E. B. did. This good artist set himself at work to please the damsel. It was just before Valentine's day three years since. He wrought, unseen and unsuspected, a wondrous work. We need not say it was on the finest gilt paper with borders -- full, not of common hearts and heartless allegory, but all the prettiest stories of love from Ovid, and older poets than Ovid (for E. B. is a scholar.) There was Pyramus and Thisbe, and be sure Dido was not forgot, nor Hero and Leander, and swans more than sang in Cayster, with mottos and fanciful devices, such as beseemed, -- a work in short of magic. Iris dipt the woof. This on Valentine's eve he commended to the all-swallowing indiscriminate orifice--(O ignoble trust!) -- of the common post; but the humble medium did its duty, and from his watchful stand, the -- next morning, he saw the cheerful messenger knock, and by and by the precious charge delivered. He saw, unseen, the happy girl unfold the Valentine, dance about, clap her hands, as one after one the pretty emblems unfolded themselves. She danced about, not with light love, or foolish expectations, for she had no lover; or, if she had, none she knew that could have created those bright images which delighted her. It was more like some fairy present; a God-send, as our familiarly pious ancestors termed a benefit received, where the benefactor was unknown. It would do her no harm. It would do her good for ever after. It is good to love the unknown. I only give this as a specimen of E. B. and his modest way of doing a concealed kindness."

這些文章中鮮有透露他的不幸，這或許是他故意遺忘這些不幸的事；但可以肯定的是，蘭姆沒有因他的不幸而失去欣嘗世界美好事物的能力。這或許解釋了一個二戰美國老兵所說的話：

"The world is imperfect, nonetheless we live happily."

Some Remarks on Scientists' and Philosophers' Social Responsibility

Is it morally required for philosophers and scientists engaging in social movement, or by exercising their rationality to change the society into a better place? I think if a scientist or philosopher who tries to change the establishment by participating into social movement, and paying her own effort to change the world into a better place, we have no reason to condemn her as she is devoted her time or even our life to enhance our rights or benefit, assuming that we are living in the same community with her. However, I can't see is there any difference if the one who participating in the same social movement is not a philosopher or scientists, or even uneducated, since we all agree that anyone who devote herself into the enhancement of society should be respected, no matter who is she and what her occupation is.

However, should a philosopher, social scientists or scholars, especially for those who works in the field of ethics, sociology, cultural studies and political science, have mush more responsibility then usual people, to participate in social movement and struggle for the benefit for most of the people? I have to admit that I can't see any plausible reason to support this claim; and on the contrary, a philosopher or scientists shouldn't actively involve in any social movement in certain situations.

To say that a person to have more responsibility, or a person,such as you, should pay more effort to do something, if either, (1) somebody have rights to ask you to act in that way and she did execute her rights, or, (2) You have a special relation with the people who would be affected by whether she acts in that way, or, (3) you committed yourself to devote your life on such a business, or (4) if you don't do it you would violating some general moral constraints such as not harming innocent people, or (5) it would bring damn good effects.

Here what I mean by philosophy and science is this: a systematic explanation and interpretation of what we encounter in our everyday life, and nothing more.

This conception of philosophy and science originated from Aristotle, or even Plato's idea that philosophy should provide some ultimate principles to explain the world. However there is a difference between Plato and Aristotle is that the former thought that by knowing the first principle we can gain a guide of our life and what we should do; but Aristotle claimed that, in the beginning of his Nicomachean Ethics, politics (and ethics) can't be learnt in the way that we learn mathematics or theoretical science, since the former require experience and practical wisdom, which is a different form of rationality required by theoretical investigation.

Therefore, what I mean by philosophy and science may be much more narrower then those referred by Aristotle, as he still called ethics and politics as a sort of science. Here, by "philosophy" and "science" I only refer to a set of propositions which can be interconnected with a logical and systematical way. (put it shortly, all interpretation and explanation of the world must be a set of propositions connected with logical relations).

Explanation may not be necessarily identified as scientific explanation as otherwise it would be impossible for anyone to construct a philosophical explanation. Here I can't give a precise definition of a philosophical explanation, but I think it should be something like the truth-condition analysis of meaning, or Tarskian scheme, having the same form with the following bicondtional statement:

TS: '思歪港每星期天都去行山' is true iff CYKong goes to hike on every Sunday.

" '思歪港每星期天都去行山' " is a name in the meta-language (in here the meta-language is English), referring to the sentence in the quotation in object-language (in here the object-language is Chinese), and the whole TS is a formula in meta-language. The analysis in this form usually can be seen in the linguistic analysis in analytic philosophy, especially those who holds that meaning of a statement is its truth conditions, such as Donald Davidson. The biconditional statements of this sort would not provide a scientific explanation of language or linguistic behavior, but they can provide a semantics for the sentences we are using, by which we can specify the way of using the sentences in different circumstances. And a complete semantics for a language L (a semantics that can clearly specify under what circumstances an utterance of sentence p is true, false and meaningless) can help us to identify the real scientific explanation from those pseudo-scientific theory, or to identify some sentences with insight from mere murmuring.

Therefore, either scientists, social scientists and philosophers are both aimed to provide a set of propositions, by which the former two describe the natural world and human society, as the latter describe the syntax and meaning of words and sentences in humans language. (linguistic analysis may not be all of philosophy, as philosophers also describe our ethical or moral intuition, motives, desire etc., all these are non-linguistic phenomena.)


Readers, if you just like me, as a common person, it is not difficult to realize if philosophy and science are systematic explanation and interpretation of the world in which we are living,the task of philosophers and scientists must be providing an adequate explanation about our world.

Here when I say that providing an adequate explanation is the task of philosophers or scientists, it just like saying that the task of the police is to catch and arrest the criminals; or the task of a cleaning worker is to clean the streets. Of course the the task may not assigned by others but it may be assigned by the agent herself, and it comes under at least one of the conditions I mentioned in paragraph 3. so it seems correct to say a philosopher should pay more effort on providing an adequate explanation of the world.



From here, I can't see why philosophers and scientists should pay more attention then usual people into the enhancement of society, as the task of philosophers and scientists I mentioned above, is not directly relevant to the well-being of our society.

It doesn't mean that philosophers and scientists should be detached from the society, they just like you and me, the usual people, sharing the same responsibility of ensuring the justice in our society.

Later I will explain why in certain situation, a scientist or philosopher should be detached from social movement.

The Arguments in Jean Paul Sartre's Existentialism and Humanism (1)

Jean Paul Sartre had clarified and argued for the theses of Existentialism, and identify it as a sort of humanism. The first principle of Existentialism is that existence came before essence, what it means is that no pre-established a prior human nature determining our decisions in our daily life. Sartre then tried to prove that agent can only follow certain morality in virtue of her own will.

The First Argument:

1. If there is no God, there is no pre-establish a prior human nature which serves as the justification of morality.
2. If there is no God and no pre-established a prior human nature can be given as the base of morality, there is no objective justification for morality.
3. Either people can follow certain morality by justification with the existence of god or human nature, or people can only follow certain morality in virtue of her own will.
4. Therefore, people can only follow certain morality in virtue of her own will.

The Second Argument argued that secular morality can't help:

Assumes that there are objective moral principles, then:

1. All moral principles must be universal principles.
2. No objective way to decide how the universal principles can be satisfied.
3. Therefore, moral agent have to decide by herself how the universal principles can be satisfied.
   

An immediate objection against the above conclusion would be that if morality can't be objectively justified and which can only be appealed to agent's own will, then how one should act would totally depends on agents' subjective will, then what we should do in any particular case would be arbitrary.

Sartre then argued that when an agent chooses for herself, she also chooses for the other. He tried to argue firstly for the claim that, based on the principle that existence came before essence, the essence of a person is what she has done, and constructed the following argument(The Third Argument):

1. The essence of a person is what she has done.
   Let x be a particular person:
   
2. What the agent x chose to do is the one she regarded as that any agents like her should do.
3. What she has done are what she chose to have done.
4. What she has done are the actions she regarded as that any agents like her should do.
5. The essence of x is what she has done.
6. The essence of x is what she regarded as that any agents like her should do.
7. Any particular person is an agent like x.
8. The essence of any particular person is what x regarded as the actions that particular person should do.
9. The essence of mankind is shaped by the essence of any particular person.
10. The essence of mankind is shaped by what x regarded as the actions that any particular person should do.
11. Therefore, x is the legislator of mankind.
12. Since x is can be substituted by any person, therefore, all persons are the legislators of the mankind.
    

Based on the above argument, Sartre can happily claim that our choices of actions are not arbitrary, since we have to be responsible to whole of the mankind, just like an artist have to be responsible to his own painting, although there is no objective rules to guide you to accomplish your works.

Whether "in choosing for himself he choose for all men" means "What the agent x chose to do is the one she regarded as that any agents like her should do." is open to objection. However if we interpret the claim literally, it would be a queer claim that I can decide what the other should do. However, if I can decide how others should act, then either they are not agents like me, or people other than me can't determine their morality with their own will; the former will lead to solipsism and the latter is contrary to the conclusion of the first argument.

Therefore, I tried to interpret the claim as the second premise of the third argument. However, this argument is not invulnerable, as I suspect that I am required to do certain act in certain situation that the action would be best for any people under the similar situation to perform. As under certain Utilitarian principles it may require different people to act differently even they are in similar situation, for maximizing the over-all utility. Sartre may not recognize the objection as a legitimate one as he failed to see how secular morality without positing the existence of God possible. But I think morality without god is possible, and if such a morality is impossible, a morality based on the existence of God is impossible also.

To Be Continued

Some Remarks on Quine's Logic (1)

In his Methods of Logic, Willard Van Orman Quine suggested to test the validity of formulae in Quantificational Logic by transcribing those formulae into Boolean Schemata and applying Truth-value Analysis and ANF. The way he suggested is quite different from the way suggested by I.M Copi in his Symbolic Logic, in which Copi suggested to provide a non-empty model with an normal interpretation to the quantificational schemata in question and test them by using truth-table method.

Moreover, In his Philosophy of Logic, in the chaper about logical truth, he tried to show that any schema-in-L that come out true under all substitution of sentences iff it is satisfied by all models, as long as the language L is reasonably rich, rich enough for elementary number theory, i.e. it can said about positive integers in terms of "+", "*", "=", "↓" and "(x)", but no sets.

The mereological attitude of Quine mentioned above can be explained by his "constructivism" that it is better to posit less on constructing theory.

However it is inevitable to posit sets if we want to simplify the ontology of numbers as set theories provide ways to express arithmetic with following three symbols: "↓", "(x)" and " ∈" and variables such as x, x', x'', x''',....etc., in this way it may be easier to say numbers are only theoretical constructs composed of logical connectives, quantifiers, membership and variables.